Effects of behavioral response and vaccination policy on epidemic spreading--an approach based on evolutionary-game dynamics.

ABSTRACT: How effective are governmental incentives to achieve widespread vaccination coverage so as to prevent epidemic outbreak? The answer largely depends on the complex interplay among the type of incentive, individual behavioral responses, and the intrinsic epidemic dynamics. By incorporating evolutionary games into epidemic dynamics, we investigate the effects of two types of incentives strategies: partial-subsidy policy in which certain fraction of the cost of vaccination is offset, and free-subsidy policy in which donees are randomly selected and vaccinated at no cost. Through mean-field analysis and computations, we find that, under the partial-subsidy policy, the vaccination coverage depends monotonically on the sensitivity of individuals to payoff difference, but the dependence is non-mon

SUBMITTER: Zhang HF 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4092348 | biostudies-literature | 2014 Jul

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature