Group-size-dependent punishment of idle subordinates in a cooperative breeder where helpers pay to stay.

ABSTRACT: In cooperative breeding systems, dominant breeders sometimes tolerate unrelated individuals even if they inflict costs on the dominants. According to the 'pay-to-stay' hypothesis, (i) subordinates can outweigh these costs by providing help and (ii) dominants should be able to enforce help by punishing subordinates that provide insufficient help. This requires that dominants can monitor helping and can recognize group members individually. In a field experiment, we tested whether cooperatively breeding cichlid Neolamprologus pulcher subordinates increase their help after a forced 'idle' period, how other group members respond to a previously idle helper, and how helper behaviour and group responses depend on group size. Previously, idle helpers increased their submissiveness and received mo

SUBMITTER: Fischer S 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4100499 | biostudies-literature | 2014 Aug

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature