The role of cognitive and emotional perspective taking in economic decision making in the ultimatum game.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Takagishi H
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4177993 | biostudies-literature | 2014
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
The role of cognitive and emotional perspective taking in economic decision making in the ultimatum game.
Takagishi Haruto H Koizumi Michiko M Fujii Takayuki T Schug Joanna J Kameshima Shinya S Yamagishi Toshio T
PloS one 20140925 9
We conducted a simple resource allocation game known as the ultimatum game (UG) with preschoolers to examine the role of cognitive and emotional perspective-taking ability on allocation and rejection behavior. A total of 146 preschoolers played the UG and completed a false belief task and an emotional perspective-taking test. Results showed that cognitive perspective taking ability had a significant positive effect on the proposer's offer and a negative effect on the responder's rejection behavi ...[more]
Similar Datasets
Project description:Much publicity has been given to the fact that people's economic decisions often deviate from the rational predictions of standard economic models. In the classic ultimatum game, for example, most people turn down financial gains by rejecting unequal monetary splits. The present study points to neglected individual differences in this debate. After participants played the ultimatum game we tested for individual differences in cognitive control capacity of the most and least economic responders. The key finding was that people who were higher in cognitive control, as measured by behavioral (Go/No-Go performance) and neural (No-Go N2 amplitude) markers, did tend to behave more in line with the standard models and showed increased acceptance of unequal splits. Hence, the cognitively highest scoring decision-makers were more likely to maximize their monetary payoffs and adhere to the standard economic predictions. Findings question popular claims with respect to the rejection of standard economic models and the irrationality of human economic decision-making.
| S-EPMC3212542 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Emotion regulation is often critical for adaptive decision making. Here, we investigate whether emotion regulation defects following focal prefrontal brain damage are associated with exceptionally irrational economic decision making in situations of unfair treatment. In the Ultimatum Game, two players are given one opportunity to split a sum of money. One player (the proposer) offers a portion of the money to the second player (the responder) and keeps the rest. The responder can either accept the offer (in which case both players split the money as proposed) or reject the offer (in which case both players get nothing). Relatively low Ultimatum offers are often rejected, and this "irrational" behavior has been attributed to an emotional reaction to unfair treatment. Using the lesion method, we tested the hypothesis that damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), an area critical for the modulation of emotional reactions, would result in exaggerated irrational economic decisions. Subjects acted as the responder to 22 different proposers who offered various splits of 10 dollars. Offers ranged from fair (give 5 dollars, keep 5 dollars) to extremely unfair (give 1 dollar, keep 9 dollars). The rejection rate of the VMPC group was higher than the rejection rates of the comparison groups for each of the most unfair offers (7 dollars/3 dollars, 8 dollars/2 dollars, 9 dollars/1 dollars). These results suggest that emotion regulation processes subserved by VMPC are a critical component of normal economic decision making.
| S-EPMC2490711 | biostudies-literature
Project description:The links between emotions, bio-regulatory processes, and economic decision-making are well-established in the context of age-related changes in fluid, real-time, decision competency. The objective of the research reported here is to assess the relative contributions, interactions, and impacts of affective and cognitive intelligence in economic, value-based decision-making amongst older adults. Additionally, we explored this decision-making competency in the context of the neurobiology of aging by examining the neuroanatomical correlates of intelligence and decision-making in an aging cohort. Thirty-nine, healthy, community dwelling older adults were administered the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), an ecologically valid laboratory measure of complex, economic decision-making; along with standardized, performance-based measures of cognitive and emotional intelligence (EI). A smaller subset of this group underwent structural brain scans from which thicknesses of the frontal, parietal, temporal, occipital, cingulate cortices and their sub-sections, were computed. Fluid (online processing) aspects of Perceptual Reasoning cognitive intelligence predicted superior choices on the IGT. However, older adults with higher overall emotional intelligence (EI) and higher Experiential EI area/sub-scores learned faster to make better choices on the IGT, even after controlling for cognitive intelligence and its area scores. Thickness of the left rostral anterior cingulate (associated with fluid affective, processing) mediated the relationship between age and Experiential EI. Thickness of the right transverse temporal gyrus moderated the rate of learning on the IGT. In conclusion, our data suggest that fluid processing, which involves "online," bottom-up, cognitive processing, predicts value-based decision-making amongst older adults, while crystallized intelligence, which relies on "offline" previously acquired knowledge, does not. However, only emotional intelligence, especially its fluid "online" aspects of affective processing predicts the rate of learning in situations of complex choice, especially when there is a paucity of cues/information available to guide decision-making. Age-related effects on these cognitive, affective and decision mechanisms may have neuroanatomical correlates, especially in regions that form a subset of the human mirror-neuron and mentalizing systems. While superior decision-making may be stereotypically associated with "smarter people" (i.e., higher cognitive intelligence), our data indicate that emotional intelligence has a significant role to play in the economic decisions of older adults.
| S-EPMC7274021 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Many studies have documented framing effects in economic games. These studies, however, have tended to use minimal framing cues (e.g. a single sentence labelling the frame), and the frames did not involve unambiguous offer expectations. Results often did not differ substantially from those in the unframed games. Here we test the hypothesis that, in contrast to the modal offer in the unframed ultimatum game (UG) (e.g. 60% to the proposer and 40% to the responder), offers in a UG explicitly framed either as a currency exchange or a windfall will closely conform to expectations for the frame and diverge substantially from the modal offer. Participants recruited from MTurk were randomized into one of two conditions. In the control condition, participants played a standard UG. In the treatment conditions, players were provided a vignette explicitly describing the frame with their roles: some were customers and bankers in a currency exchange, and others were in a windfall scenario. We predicted (i) that modal offers in the currency exchange would involve an asymmetric split where greater than 80% went to customers and less than 20% went to bankers, and (ii) that variation in windfall offers would converge onto a 50-50 split with significantly less variation than the control condition. Our first prediction was confirmed with substantial effect sizes (d = 1.09 and d = -2.04), whereas we found no evidence for our second prediction. The first result provides further evidence that it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about economic decision-making from decontextualized games.
| S-EPMC5749986 | biostudies-literature
Project description:One of the most prominent paradigms in neuroeconomics is the ultimatum game (UG) that provides a framework for the study of pro-social behavior in two players interacting anonymously with each other: Player 1 has to split an endowment with player 2. Player 2 can either accept or reject the offer from player 1. If player 2 accepts the offer then the money is split as proposed by player 1. In case of rejection both players get nothing. Until now only one twin study investigated the heritability of the behavior in the UG. Results indicated a strong heritability for the decision behavior of player 2 whereas no genetic influence on player 1 behavior could be detected. Further studies are mandatory to validate these heritability estimates. However, a first candidate polymorphism, the DRD4 exon III, constituting the biological basis of the heritability in the responder behavior has already been identified in a Chinese sample (Zhong et al., 2010). Until now genetic studies in Caucasians on the UG are lacking. The present study wants to fill this gap by investigating the UG in a healthy German sample. Moreover, we intend to find candidate genes that are associated with the first-mover-behavior. In a sample of N = 130 healthy participants an online version of the UG was conducted and polymorphisms of the dopamine D2 receptor gene (DRD2) and the DRD4 exon III VNTR were genotyped. We could confirm the DRD4 exon III effect on the responder behavior and the absence of an effect on the proposer behavior reported before. In line with Zhong et al. (2010) carriers of the 4/4 genotype showed a significant higher minimal acceptable offer (p = 0.023) than subjects with any other genotype. Furthermore, a DRD2-haplotype-block containing the single nucleotide polymorphisms rs1800497 and rs2283265 was significantly associated with the amount player1 offered (p = 0.005) but not with the decision of player 2. Results support the importance of the dopaminergic system for pro-social behavior.
| S-EPMC3671187 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Despite the wealth of studies investigating factors affecting decisions, not much is known about the impact of stereotypical beliefs on strategic economic decision-making. In the present study, we used the ultimatum game paradigm to investigate how participants playing as proposer modulate their strategic economic behavior, according to their game counterparts' stereotypical identity (i.e., responders). The latter were introduced to the participants using occupational role nouns stereotypically marked with gender paired with feminine or masculine proper names (e.g., linguist-Anna; economist-David; economist-Cristina; linguist-Leonardo). When playing with male-stereotyped responders, proposers quickly applied the equity rule, behaving fairly, while they adopted a strategic behavior with responders characterized by female stereotypes. They were also longer to make their offers to female than to male responders but both kinds of responders received comparable offers, suggesting a greater cognitive effort to treat females as equally as males. The present study explicitly demonstrates that gender stereotypical information affect strategic economic decision-making and highlights a possible evolution of gender discrimination into a more insidious discrimination toward individuals with female characteristics.
| S-EPMC4724784 | biostudies-literature
Project description:According to the dual-system theories, the decisions in an ultimatum game (UG) are governed by the automatic System 1 and the controlled System 2. The former drives the preference for fairness, whereas the latter drives the self-interest motive. However, the association between the contributions of the two systems in UG and the cognitive process needs more direct evidence. In the present study, we used the process dissociation procedure to estimate the contributions of the two systems and recorded participants eye movements to examine the cognitive processes underlying UG decisions. Results showed that the estimated contributions of the two systems are uncorrelated and that they demonstrate a dissociated pattern of associations with third variables, such as reaction time (RT) and mean fixation duration (MFD). Furthermore, the relative time advantage (RTA) and the transitions between the two payoffs can predict the final UG decisions. Our findings provide evidence for the independent contributions of preference for fairness (System 1) and self-interest maximizing (System 2) inclinations to UG and shed light on the underlying processes.
| S-EPMC9552838 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Humans assess the distributions of resources based on their aversion to unfairness. If a partner distributes in an unfair manner even though the partner had a less unfair distribution option, a recipient will believe that the partner should have chosen the counterfactual option. In this study, we investigated the neural basis for fairness evaluation of actual and counterfactual options in the ultimatum game. In this task, a partner chose one distribution option out of two options, and a participant accepted or rejected the option. The behavioral results showed that the acceptance rate was influenced by counterfactual evaluation (CE), among others, as defined by the difference of monetary amount between the actual and counterfactual options. The functional magnetic resonance imaging results showed that CE was associated with the right ventral angular gyrus (vAG) that provided one of convergent inputs to the supramarginal gyrus related to decision utility, which reflects gross preferences for the distribution options. Furthermore, inhibitory repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation administered to the right vAG reduced the behavioral component associated with CE. These results suggest that our acceptance/rejection of distribution options relies on multiple processes (monetary amount, disadvantageous inequity, and CE) and that the right vAG causally contributes to CE.
| S-EPMC10016052 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Fluid intelligence decreases with age, yet evidence about age declines in decision-making quality is mixed: Depending on the study, older adults make worse, equally good, or even better decisions than younger adults. We propose a potential explanation for this puzzle, namely that age differences in decision performance result from the interplay between two sets of cognitive capabilities that impact decision making, one in which older adults fare worse (i.e., fluid intelligence) and one in which they fare better (i.e., crystallized intelligence). Specifically, we hypothesized that older adults' higher levels of crystallized intelligence can provide an alternate pathway to good decisions when the fluid intelligence pathway declines. The performance of older adults relative to younger adults therefore depends on the relative importance of each type of intelligence for the decision at hand. We tested this complementary capabilities hypothesis in a broad sample of younger and older adults, collecting a battery of standard cognitive measures and measures of economically important decision-making "traits"--including temporal discounting, loss aversion, financial literacy, and debt literacy. We found that older participants performed as well as or better than younger participants on these four decision-making measures. Structural equation modeling verified our hypothesis: Older participants' greater crystallized intelligence offset their lower levels of fluid intelligence for temporal discounting, financial literacy, and debt literacy, but not for loss aversion. These results have important implications for public policy and for the design of effective decision environments for older adults.
| S-EPMC4086863 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectiveIt is common for individuals to engage in taxing cognitive activity for prolonged periods of time, resulting in cognitive fatigue that has the potential to produce significant effects in behaviour and decision making. We sought to examine whether cognitive fatigue modulates economic decision making.MethodsWe employed a between-subject manipulation design, inducing fatigue through 60 to 90 minutes of taxing cognitive engagement against a control group that watched relaxing videos for a matched period of time. Both before and after the manipulation, participants engaged in two economic decision making tasks (one for gains and one for losses). The analyses focused on two areas of economic decision making--preferences and choice strategies. Uncertainty preferences (risk and ambiguity) were quantified as premium values, defined as the degree and direction in which participants alter the valuation of the gamble in comparison to the certain option. The strategies that each participant engaged in were quantified through a choice strategy metric, which contrasts the degree to which choice behaviour relies upon available satisficing or maximizing information. We separately examined these metrics for alterations within both the gains and losses domains, through the two choice tasks.ResultsThe fatigue manipulation resulted in significantly greater levels of reported subjective fatigue, with correspondingly higher levels of reported effort during the cognitively taxing activity. Cognitive fatigue did not alter uncertainty preferences (risk or ambiguity) or informational strategies, in either the gains or losses domains. Rather, cognitive fatigue resulted in greater test-retest variability across most of our economic measures. These results indicate that cognitive fatigue destabilizes economic decision making, resulting in inconsistent preferences and informational strategies that may significantly reduce decision quality.
| S-EPMC4521815 | biostudies-literature