Virtual bargaining: a theory of social decision-making.
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ABSTRACT: An essential element of goal-directed decision-making in social contexts is that agents' actions may be mutually interdependent. However, the most well-developed approaches to such strategic interactions, based on the Nash equilibrium concept in game theory, are sometimes too broad and at other times 'overlook' good solutions to fundamental social dilemmas and coordination problems. The authors propose a new theory of social decision-making-virtual bargaining-in which individuals decide among a set of moves on the basis of what they would agree to do if they could openly bargain. The core principles of a formal account are outlined (vis-à-vis the notions of 'feasible agreement' and explicit negotiation) and further illustrated with the introduction of a new game, dubbed the 'Boobytrap game
SUBMITTER: Misyak JB
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4186239 | biostudies-literature | 2014 Nov
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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