The role of self-interest in elite bargaining.
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ABSTRACT: One of the best-known and most replicated laboratory results in behavioral economics is that bargainers frequently reject low offers, even when it harms their material self-interest. This finding could have important implications for international negotiations on many problems facing humanity today, because models of international bargaining assume exactly the opposite: that policy makers are rational and self-interested. However, it is unknown whether elites who engage in diplomatic bargaining will similarly reject low offers because past research has been based almost exclusively on convenience samples of undergraduates, members of the general public, or small-scale societies rather than highly experienced elites who design and bargain over policy. Using a unique sample of 102 policy and
SUBMITTER: LeVeck BL
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4284540 | biostudies-literature | 2014 Dec
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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