HOW MUCH FAVORABLE SELECTION IS LEFT IN MEDICARE ADVANTAGE?

ABSTRACT: The health economics literature contains two models of selection, one with endogenous plan characteristics to attract good risks and one with fixed plan characteristics; neither model contains a regulator. Medicare Advantage, a principal example of selection in the literature, is, however, subject to anti-selection regulations. Because selection causes economic inefficiency and because the historically favorable selection into Medicare Advantage plans increased government cost, the effectiveness of the anti-selection regulations is an important policy question, especially since the Medicare Advantage program has grown to comprise 30 percent of Medicare beneficiaries. Moreover, similar anti-selection regulations are being used in health insurance exchanges for those under 65. Contrary to ea

SUBMITTER: Newhouse JP 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4572504 | biostudies-literature | 2015

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature