Collective punishment is more effective than collective reward for promoting cooperation.
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ABSTRACT: Collective punishment and reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the evolution of cooperation. Both scenarios, however, seem problematic to understand cooperative behavior, because they can raise the second-order free-rider problem and many organisms are not able to discriminate less cooperating individuals. Even though they have been proved to increase cooperation, there has been a debate about which one being more effective. To address this issue, we resort to the N-player evolutionary snowdrift game (NESG), where a collective punishment/reward mechanism is added by allowing some players to display punishment/reward towards all remaining players. By means of numerous simulations and analyses, we find that collective punishment is more effective in promoting co
SUBMITTER: Gao L
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4669458 | biostudies-literature | 2015 Dec
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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