Greed and Fear in Network Reciprocity: Implications for Cooperation among Organizations.

ABSTRACT: Extensive interdisciplinary literatures have built on the seminal spatial dilemmas model, which depicts the evolution of cooperation on regular lattices, with strategies propagating locally by relative fitness. In this model agents may cooperate with neighbors, paying an individual cost to enhance their collective welfare, or they may exploit cooperative neighbors and diminish collective welfare. Recent research has extended the model in numerous ways, incorporating behavioral noise, implementing other network topologies or adaptive networks, and employing alternative dynamics of replication. Although the underlying dilemma arises from two distinct dimensions-the gains for exploiting cooperative partners (Greed) and the cost of cooperating with exploitative partners (Fear)-most work follow

SUBMITTER: Kitts JA 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4749156 | biostudies-literature | 2016

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature