Cognitive Model of Trust Dynamics Predicts Human Behavior within and between Two Games of Strategic Interaction with Computerized Confederate Agents.
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ABSTRACT: When playing games of strategic interaction, such as iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and iterated Chicken Game, people exhibit specific within-game learning (e.g., learning a game's optimal outcome) as well as transfer of learning between games (e.g., a game's optimal outcome occurring at a higher proportion when played after another game). The reciprocal trust players develop during the first game is thought to mediate transfer of learning effects. Recently, a computational cognitive model using a novel trust mechanism has been shown to account for human behavior in both games, including the transfer between games. We present the results of a study in which we evaluate the model's a priori predictions of human learning and transfer in 16 different conditions. The model's predictive validity i
SUBMITTER: Collins MG
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4751270 | biostudies-literature | 2016
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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