An evolutionary game approach for determination of the structural conflicts in signed networks.

ABSTRACT: Social or biochemical networks can often divide into two opposite alliances in response to structural conflicts between positive (friendly, activating) and negative (hostile, inhibiting) interactions. Yet, the underlying dynamics on how the opposite alliances are spontaneously formed to minimize the structural conflicts is still unclear. Here, we demonstrate that evolutionary game dynamics provides a felicitous possible tool to characterize the evolution and formation of alliances in signed networks. Indeed, an evolutionary game dynamics on signed networks is proposed such that each node can adaptively adjust its choice of alliances to maximize its own fitness, which yet leads to a minimization of the structural conflicts in the entire network. Numerical experiments show that the evolution

SUBMITTER: Tan S 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4768106 | biostudies-literature | 2016 Feb

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature