Priming Children's Use of Intentions in Moral Judgement with Metacognitive Training.

ABSTRACT: Typically, adults give a primary role to the agent's intention to harm when performing a moral judgment of accidental harm. By contrast, children often focus on outcomes, underestimating the actor's mental states when judging someone for his action, and rely on what we suppose to be intuitive and emotional processes. The present study explored the processes involved in the development of the capacity to integrate agents' intentions into their moral judgment of accidental harm in 5 to 8-year-old children. This was done by the use of different metacognitive trainings reinforcing different abilities involved in moral judgments (mentalising abilities, executive abilities, or no reinforcement), similar to a paradigm previously used in the field of deductive logic. Children's moral judgments wer

SUBMITTER: Gvozdic K 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4797364 | biostudies-literature | 2016

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature