An oscillating tragedy of the commons in replicator dynamics with game-environment feedback.

ABSTRACT: A tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals take actions to maximize their payoffs even as their combined payoff is less than the global maximum had the players coordinated. The originating example is that of overgrazing of common pasture lands. In game-theoretic treatments of this example, there is rarely consideration of how individual behavior subsequently modifies the commons and associated payoffs. Here, we generalize evolutionary game theory by proposing a class of replicator dynamics with feedback-evolving games in which environment-dependent payoffs and strategies coevolve. We initially apply our formulation to a system in which the payoffs favor unilateral defection and cooperation, given replete and depleted environments, respectively. Using this approach, we identify and ch

SUBMITTER: Weitz JS 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5127343 | biostudies-literature | 2016 Nov

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature