Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system.

ABSTRACT: Punishment of non-cooperators-free riders-can lead to high cooperation in public goods games (PGG). However, second-order free riders, who do not pay punishment costs, reduce the effectiveness of punishment. Here we introduce a "leader support system," in which one group leader can freely punish group followers using capital pooled through the support of group followers. In our experiment, participants engage in three stages repeatedly: a PGG stage in which followers decide to cooperate for their group; a support stage in which followers decide whether to support the leader; and a punishment stage in which the leader can punish any follower. We compare a support-present condition with a no-support condition, in which there is an external source for the leader's punishment. The results show

SUBMITTER: Ozono H 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5146942 | biostudies-literature | 2016 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature