Bribery games on inter-dependent regular networks.

ABSTRACT: We examine a scenario of social conflict that is manifest during an interaction between government servants providing a service and citizens who are legally entitled to the service, using evolutionary game-theory in structured populations characterized by an inter-dependent network. Bribe-demands by government servants during such transactions, called harassment bribes, constitute a widespread form of corruption in many countries. We investigate the effect of varying bribe demand made by corrupt officials and the cost of complaining incurred by harassed citizens, on the proliferation of corrupt strategies in the population. We also examine how the connectivity of the various constituent networks affects the spread of corrupt officials in the population. We find that incidents of bribery ca

SUBMITTER: Verma P 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5311942 | biostudies-literature | 2017 Feb

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature