Group augmentation, collective action, and territorial boundary patrols by male chimpanzees.

ABSTRACT: How can collective action evolve when individuals benefit from cooperation regardless of whether they pay its participation costs? According to one influential perspective, collective action problems are common, especially when groups are large, but may be solved when individuals who have more to gain from the collective good or can produce it at low costs provide it to others as a byproduct. Several results from a 20-y study of one of the most striking examples of collective action in nonhuman animals, territorial boundary patrolling by male chimpanzees, are consistent with these ideas. Individuals were more likely to patrol when (i) they had more to gain because they had many offspring in the group; (ii) they incurred relatively low costs because of their high dominance ran

SUBMITTER: Langergraber KE 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5514721 | biostudies-literature | 2017 Jul

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature