Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation.

ABSTRACT: Second-order free riders, who do not owe punishment cost to first-order free riders in public goods games, lead to low cooperation. Previous studies suggest that for stable cooperation, it is critical to have a pool punishment system with second-order punishment, which gathers resources from group members and punishes second-order free riders as well as first-order free riders. In this study, we focus on the priority of punishment. We hypothesize that the pool punishment system that prioritizes second-order punishment is more likely to achieve cooperation than the system that prioritizes first-order punishment, because the former is more likely to obtain sufficient punishment resources. In the experiments, we compare four pool punishment systems: 1To2 (first-order punishment to second-orde

SUBMITTER: Ozono H 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5662696 | biostudies-literature | 2017 Oct

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature