Separating conditional and unconditional cooperation in a sequential Prisoner's Dilemma game.

ABSTRACT: Most theories of social exchange distinguish between two different types of cooperation, depending on whether or not cooperation occurs conditional upon the partner's previous behaviors. Here, we used a multinomial processing tree model to distinguish between positive and negative reciprocity and cooperation bias in a sequential Prisoner's Dilemma game. In Experiments 1 and 2, the facial expressions of the partners were varied to manipulate cooperation bias. In Experiment 3, an extinction instruction was used to manipulate reciprocity. The results confirm that people show a stronger cooperation bias when interacting with smiling compared to angry-looking partners, supporting the notion that a smiling facial expression in comparison to an angry facial expression helps to construe a situatio

SUBMITTER: Bell R 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5679624 | biostudies-literature | 2017

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature