Stochastic evolutionary voluntary public goods game with punishment in a Quasi-birth-and-death process.

ABSTRACT: Traditional replication dynamic model and the corresponding concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) only takes into account whether the system can return to the equilibrium after being subjected to a small disturbance. In the real world, due to continuous noise, the ESS of the system may not be stochastically stable. In this paper, a model of voluntary public goods game with punishment is studied in a stochastic situation. Unlike the existing model, we describe the evolutionary process of strategies in the population as a generalized quasi-birth-and-death process. And we investigate the stochastic stable equilibrium (SSE) instead. By numerical experiments, we get all possible SSEs of the system for any combination of parameters, and investigate the influence of parameters on the prob

SUBMITTER: Quan J 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5700967 | biostudies-literature | 2017 Nov

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature