When honesty and cheating pay off: the evolution of honest and dishonest equilibria in a conventional signalling game.

ABSTRACT:

Background

The reliability of signals is a key issue in the study of animal communication. Both empirical work and theoretical models show that communication need not be entirely honest, and thus signals can be deceitful. Aggressive communication appears to be a prime candidate for such deceitful communication, because bluffing has been described in several species. Bluffing in these situations are supposed to be maintained by frequency dependent selection where the fitness of a given type depends on the frequencies of the other types in the population. Previous efforts to model such a scenario through individual based simulations have yielded conflicting results. Studies have either found a rich set of polymorphic strategies including the traditional cheating scenario or found non

SUBMITTER: Szamado S 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5745956 | biostudies-literature | 2017 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature