Retailer Stackelberg game in a supply chain with pricing and service decisions and simple price discount contract.

ABSTRACT: This paper studies the Retailer Stackelberg game in a supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and one retailer where they compete simultaneously under three factors including price, service and simple price discount contract. It is assumed that the second manufacturer provides service directly to his customers, and the retailer provides service for the first product's customers, while the retailer buys the first product under price discount from the first manufacturer. The analysis of the optimal equilibrium solutions and the results of the numerical examples show that if a manufacturer chooses the appropriate range of discount rate, he will gain more profit than when there is no discount given to the retailer. This situation can be considered as an effective tool for the coordination

SUBMITTER: Sadjadi SJ 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5896922 | biostudies-literature | 2018

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature