Homophily, heterophily and the diversity of messages among decision-making individuals.

ABSTRACT: To better understand the intriguing mechanisms behind cooperation among decision-making individuals, we study the simple yet appealing use of preplay communication or cheap talk in evolutionary games, when players are able to choose strategies based on whether an opponent sends the same message as they do. So when playing games, in addition to pure cooperation and defection, players have two new strategies in this setting: homophilic (respectively, heterophilic) cooperation which is to cooperate (respectively, defect) only with those who send the same message as they do. We reveal the intrinsic qualities of individuals playing the two strategies and show that under the replicator dynamics, homophilic cooperators engage in a battle of messages and will become dominated by whichever message

SUBMITTER: Ramazi P 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5936958 | biostudies-literature | 2018 Apr

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature