Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game.

ABSTRACT: Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the tragedy of the common state, punishing the latter group seems to be an adequate reaction. This conclusion, however, is less straightforward when we acknowledge the fact that resources are finite and even a renewable resource has limited growing capacity. To clarify the possible consequences, we consider a coevolutionary model where beside the payoff-driven competition of cooperator and defector players the level of a renewable resource depends sensitively on the fraction of cooperators and the total consumption of all players. The applied feedback-evolv

SUBMITTER: Chen X 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6070290 | biostudies-literature | 2018 Jul

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature