Disapproval aversion or inflated inequity acceptance? The impact of expressing emotions in ultimatum bargaining.

ABSTRACT: Past experimental research has shown that when rating systems are available, buyers are more generous in accepting unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. However, it also suggests that, under these conditions, sellers behave more fairly to avoid receiving negative feedback. This paper experimentally investigates which effect is stronger with the use of a rating system: buyers' inflated inequity acceptance or sellers' disapproval aversion. We explore this question by varying the information condition on the buyers' side. Our experiment shows that in a setup where the size of the pie is common knowledge for both buyers and sellers, when a rating system is present, the sellers exhibit disapproval aversion but the buyers do not display greater acceptance of inequity. By contrast, when only sel

SUBMITTER: Chen JI 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6223739 | biostudies-literature | 2018

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature