One problem, too many solutions: How costly is honest signalling of need?

ABSTRACT: The "cost of begging" is a prominent prediction of costly signalling theory, suggesting that offspring begging has to be costly in order to be honest. Seminal signalling models predict that there is a unique equilibrium cost function for the offspring that results in honest signalling and this cost function must be proportional to parent's fitness loss. This prediction is only valid if signal cost and offspring condition is assumed to be independent. Here we generalize these models by allowing signal cost to depend on offspring condition. We demonstrate in the generalized model that any signal cost proportional to the fitness gain of the offspring also results in honest signalling. Moreover, we show that any linear combination of the two cost functions (one proportional to parent's fitness

SUBMITTER: Szamado S 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6329501 | biostudies-literature | 2019

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature