Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence from Long-Term Care Hospitals.

ABSTRACT: We study the design of provider incentives in the post-acute care setting - a high-stakes but under-studied segment of the healthcare system. We focus on long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) and the large (approximately $13,500) jump in Medicare payments they receive when a patient s stay reaches a threshold number of days. Discharges increase substantially after the threshold, with the marginal discharged patient in relatively better health. Despite the large financial incentives and behavioral response in a high mortality population, we are unable to detect any compelling evidence of an impact on patient mortality. To assess provider behavior under counterfactual payment schedules, we estimate a simple dynamic discrete choice model of LTCH discharge decisions. When we conservatively limit ou

SUBMITTER: Einav L 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6529222 | biostudies-literature | 2018 Nov

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature