Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games.

ABSTRACT: Mechanisms and conditions for the spontaneous emergence of cooperation in multi-player social dilemma games remain an open question. This paper focuses on stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games with different exclusion strategies. We introduce four strategy types in the population, namely, cooperation, defection, loner and exclusion. Synchronous and asynchronous exclusion forms have been compared in finite-sized, well-mixed and structured populations. In addition, we verify that the asynchronous exclusion mechanism is indeed better than the synchronous exclusion mechanism in all cases. The benefits of the asynchronous exclusion are measured by comparing the probability that the system chooses the cooperative states in the two situations. In the well-mixed population cases, onl

SUBMITTER: Quan J 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6547755 | biostudies-literature | 2019 Jun

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature