Unknown

Dataset Information

Competition for novelty reduces information sampling in a research game-a registered report.


ABSTRACT: Incentive structures shape scientists' research practices. One incentive in particular, rewarding priority of publication, is hypothesized to harm scientific reliability by promoting rushed, low-quality research. Here, we develop a laboratory experiment to test whether competition affects information sampling and guessing accuracy in a game that mirrors aspects of scientific investigation. In our experiment, individuals gather data in order to guess true states of the world and face a tradeoff between guessing quickly and increasing accuracy by acquiring more information. To test whether competition affects accuracy, we compare a treatment in which individuals are rewarded for each correct guess to a treatment where individuals face the possibility of being 'scooped' by a competitor. In a

SUBMITTER: Tiokhin L 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6549967 | biostudies-literature | 2019 May

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature