Group leaders establish cooperative norms that persist in subsequent interactions.
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ABSTRACT: The temptation to free-ride on others' contributions to public goods makes enhancing cooperation a critical challenge. Solutions to the cooperation problem have centered on installing a sanctioning institution where all can punish all, i.e., peer punishment. But a new, growing literature considers whether and when the designation of a group leader-one group member, given the sole ability to administer punishment-is an effective and efficient alternative. What remains unknown is whether and to what extent these group leaders establish cooperative norms in their groups via their own contributions to the public good, their use of sanctions, or both. Nor has past work examined whether leaders' behaviors have lasting effects on non-leaders' cooperation in subsequent interactions, outside of the
SUBMITTER: Harrell A
PROVIDER: S-EPMC6752774 | biostudies-literature | 2019
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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