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The influence of heterogeneous learning ability on the evolution of cooperation.

ABSTRACT: In this paper, we design a simple coevolution model to investigate the role of heterogeneous learning ability on the evolution of cooperation. The model weakens the winner's learning ability in order to keep its current advantage. Conversely, it strengthens the loser's learning ability for increasing the chance to update its strategy. In particular, we consider this coevolutionary model separately applying to both cooperators and defectors (rule I), only cooperators (rule II), as well as only defectors (rule III) in spatial prisoner's dilemma game. Through numerical simulations, we find that cooperation can be promoted in rule II, whereas, cooperation is hampered in rule I and rule III. We reveal its potential reason from the viewpoint of enduring and expanding periods in game dynamics. Our results thus provide a deeper understanding regarding the heterogeneous learning ability on game theory.

SUBMITTER: Li X

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6763452 | biostudies-literature | 2019 Sep

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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The influence of heterogeneous learning ability on the evolution of cooperation.

Li Xiaogang X Geng Yini Y Shen Chen C Shi Lei L

Scientific reports 20190926 1

In this paper, we design a simple coevolution model to investigate the role of heterogeneous learning ability on the evolution of cooperation. The model weakens the winner's learning ability in order to keep its current advantage. Conversely, it strengthens the loser's learning ability for increasing the chance to update its strategy. In particular, we consider this coevolutionary model separately applying to both cooperators and defectors (rule I), only cooperators (rule II), as well as only de ...[more]

PMID: 31558763

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