Bound to the group and blinded by the leader: ideological leader-follower dynamics in a trust economic game.

ABSTRACT: Understanding the dynamics of trustworthiness in ideological contexts could influence human societies, affect electoral campaigns and ultimately impact democracy. We tested trust behaviour towards political leaders in a sample of 121 opposing/supporting voters assigned as trustors in an iterative trust game (TG). In two experiments, a famous Italian conservative leader (i.e. Silvio Berlusconi) or a famous non-politician were used as trustees in a predefined un/trustworthy TG, while trustors believed that mathematical algorithms reproduced trustee's real behaviour. Results revealed that depending on the group, voters either relied on the situation and adjusted to the behaviour of the out-group leader (in our case left-wing voters), or on their disposition for group-loyalty with respect for

SUBMITTER: Gjoneska B 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6774964 | biostudies-literature | 2019 Sep

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature