Responses to Economic Games of Cooperation and Conflict in Squirrel Monkeys (Saimiri boliviensis).

ABSTRACT: Games from experimental economics have provided insights into the evolutionary roots of social decision making in primates and other species. Multiple primate species' abilities to cooperate, coordinate and anti-coordinate have been tested utilizing variants of these simple games. Past research, however, has focused on species known to cooperate and coordinate in the wild. To begin to address the degree to which cooperation and coordination may be a general ability that manifests in specific contexts, the present study assessed the decisions of squirrel monkeys (Saimiri boliviensis; N = 10), a species not known for their cooperative behavior in these games. Pairs of monkeys were presented with the Assurance Game (a coordination game), the Hawk-Dove Game (an anti-coordination game) a

SUBMITTER: Vale GL 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7017426 | biostudies-literature | 2019 Feb

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature