High thresholds encouraging the evolution of cooperation in threshold public-good games.

ABSTRACT: For a well-mixed population, we consider a threshold public good game where group members only obtain benefits from a public good if a sufficiently large number of them cooperates. We investigate the effect of an increase in the threshold on the level of cooperation that evolves. It is shown that for sufficiently large participation costs, the level of cooperation is higher for low and for high thresholds, than it is for intermediate thresholds - where in the latter case cooperation may not evolve at all. The counterintuitive effect where an increase in the threshold from an intermediate to a high one decreases the probability of cooperation, is related to the so-called common-enemy hypothesis of the evolution of cooperation. We further apply our analysis to assess the relative weight of d

SUBMITTER: De Jaegher K 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7125178 | biostudies-literature | 2020 Apr

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature