Biased belief updating and suboptimal choice in foraging decisions.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Garrett N
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7347922 | biostudies-literature | 2020 Jul
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Biased belief updating and suboptimal choice in foraging decisions.
Garrett Neil N Daw Nathaniel D ND
Nature communications 20200709 1
Deciding which options to engage, and which to forego, requires developing accurate beliefs about the overall distribution of prospects. Here we adapt a classic prey selection task from foraging theory to examine how individuals keep track of an environment's reward rate and adjust choices in response to its fluctuations. Preference shifts were most pronounced when the environment improved compared to when it deteriorated. This is best explained by a trial-by-trial learning model in which partic ...[more]
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