Risk tolerance and control perception in a game-theoretic bioeconomic model for small-scale fisheries.

ABSTRACT: Cooperation is generally the most advantageous strategy for the group; however, on an individual level, cheating is frequently more attractive. In a fishery, one can choose to cooperate by fishing only the regulated amount or not to cooperate, by fishing to maximize profits. Top-down management can help to emulate a cooperative result in fisheries, but it is costly and not always a viable alternative for development states. Here, we investigate elements of a fishing system that can be strategically managed to encourage a cooperative behaviour. Using bioeconomic data, we modelled an evolutionary game between two populations of fishers that differ if they cooperate or do not cooperate with a fishing restriction. We penalized players including risk tolerance and control perception, two social

SUBMITTER: de Azevedo EZD 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7428242 | biostudies-literature | 2020 Jul

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature