The cancellation effect at the group level.

ABSTRACT: Group selection models combine selection pressure at the individual level with selection pressure at the group level. Cooperation can be costly for individuals, but beneficial for the group, and therefore, if individuals are sufficiently much assorted, and cooperators find themselves in groups with disproportionately many other cooperators, cooperation can evolve. The existing literature on group selection generally assumes that competition between groups takes place in a well-mixed population of groups, where any group competes with any other group equally intensely. Competition between groups however might very well occur locally; groups may compete more intensely with nearby than with far-away groups. We show that if competition between groups is indeed local, then the evolution of coop

SUBMITTER: Akdeniz A 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7496855 | biostudies-literature | 2020 Jul

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature