A dynamic over games drives selfish agents to win-win outcomes.

ABSTRACT: Understanding human institutions, animal cultures and other social systems requires flexible formalisms that describe how their members change them from within. We introduce a framework for modelling how agents change the games they participate in. We contrast this between-game 'institutional evolution' with the more familiar within-game 'behavioural evolution'. We model institutional change by following small numbers of persistent agents as they select and play a changing series of games. Starting from an initial game, a group of agents trace trajectories through game space by navigating to increasingly preferable games until they converge on 'attractor' games. Agents use their 'institutional preferences' for game features (such as stability, fairness and efficiency) to choose between nei

SUBMITTER: Frey S 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7779514 | biostudies-literature | 2020 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature