Free neighborhood choice boosts socially optimal outcomes in stag-hunt coordination problem.

ABSTRACT: Situations where independent agents need to align their activities to achieve individually and socially beneficial outcomes are abundant, reaching from everyday situations like fixing a time for a meeting to global problems like climate change agreements. Often such situations can be described as stag-hunt games, where coordinating on the socially efficient outcome is individually optimal but also entails a risk of losing out. Previous work has shown that in fixed interaction neighborhoods agents' behavior mostly converges to the collectively inefficient outcome. However, in the field, interaction neighborhoods often can be self-determined. Theoretical work investigating such circumstances is ambiguous in whether the efficient or inefficient outcome will prevail. We performed an experiment

SUBMITTER: Riedl A 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8032720 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Apr

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature