Mistakes can stabilise the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors games.

ABSTRACT: A game of rock-paper-scissors is an interesting example of an interaction where none of the pure strategies strictly dominates all others, leading to a cyclic pattern. In this work, we consider an unstable version of rock-paper-scissors dynamics and allow individuals to make behavioural mistakes during the strategy execution. We show that such an assumption can break a cyclic relationship leading to a stable equilibrium emerging with only one strategy surviving. We consider two cases: completely random mistakes when individuals have no bias towards any strategy and a general form of mistakes. Then, we determine conditions for a strategy to dominate all other strategies. However, given that individuals who adopt a dominating strategy are still prone to behavioural mistakes in the observed b

SUBMITTER: Kleshnina M 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8062094 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Apr

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature