Strategies for poverty alleviation supply chain with government subsidies and misreporting behavior in China.

ABSTRACT: In the poverty alleviation supply chain, subsidies for enterprises or farmers are widely implemented as part of government policy. However, subsidy fraud often occurs, such as misreporting cost information to secure subsidies. Inspired by this, our study aims to explore the optimal decision-making problem of the three-level (government + enterprises + farmers) poverty alleviation supply chain under asymmetric cost information. Four-stage models are constructed to capture the interactions among these three players. Additionally, numerical examples are used to analyze the implications of key parameters, such as cost coefficient and punitive measures coefficient, on supply chain members' optimal decision and profit. Our findings demonstrate that both the enterprise and the farmer can obtain m

SUBMITTER: Ye F 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8282072 | biostudies-literature | 2021

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature