The representational structure of mental states generalizes across target people and stimulus modalities.

ABSTRACT: Each individual experiences mental states in their own idiosyncratic way, yet perceivers can accurately understand a huge variety of states across unique individuals. How do they accomplish this feat? Do people think about their own anger in the same ways as another person's anger? Is reading about someone's anxiety the same as seeing it? Here, we test the hypothesis that a common conceptual core unites mental state representations across contexts. Across three studies, participants judged the mental states of multiple targets, including a generic other, the self, a socially close other, and a socially distant other. Participants viewed mental state stimuli in multiple modalities, including written scenarios and images. Using representational similarity analysis, we found that brain region

SUBMITTER: Weaverdyck ME 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8327621 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Sep

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature