No Moral Wiggle Room in an Experimental Corruption Game.

ABSTRACT: Recent experimental evidence reveals that information is often avoided by decision makers in order to create and exploit a so-called "moral wiggle room," which reduces the psychological and moral costs associated with selfish behavior. Despite the relevance of this phenomenon for corrupt practices from both a legal and a moral point of view, it has hitherto never been examined in a corruption context. We test for information avoidance in a framed public procurement experiment, in which a public official receives bribes from two competing firms and often faces a tradeoff between maximizing bribes and citizen welfare. In a treatment where officials have the option to remain ignorant about the implications of their actions for citizens, we find practically no evidence of information avoidance

SUBMITTER: Balafoutas L 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8416513 | biostudies-literature | 2021

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature