The effects of reputation on inequality in network cooperation games.

ABSTRACT: In the last several decades, ample evidence from across evolutionary biology, behavioural economics and econophysics has solidified our knowledge that reputation can promote cooperation across different contexts and environments. Higher levels of cooperation entail higher final payoffs on average, but how are these payoffs distributed among individuals? This study investigates how public and objective reputational information affects payoff inequality in repeated social dilemma interactions in large groups. I consider two aspects of inequality: excessive dispersion of final payoffs and diminished correspondence between final payoff and cooperative behaviour. I use a simple heuristics-based agent model to demonstrate that reputational information does not always increase the dispersion of f

SUBMITTER: Tsvetkova M 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8487746 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Nov

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature