Dataset Information

Balancing financial incentives during COVID-19: A comparison of provider payment adjustments across 20 countries.

ABSTRACT: Provider payment mechanisms were adjusted in many countries in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Our objective was to review adjustments for hospitals and healthcare professionals across 20 countries. We developed an analytical framework distinguishing between payment adjustments compensating income loss and those covering extra costs related to COVID-19. Information was extracted from the Covid-19 Health System Response Monitor (HSRM) and classified according to the framework. We found that income loss was not a problem in countries where professionals were paid by salary or capitation and hospitals received global budgets. In countries where payment was based on activity, income loss was compensated through budgets and higher fees. New FFS payments were introduced to incentivize remote services. Payments for COVID-19 related costs included new fees for out- and inpatient services but also new PD and DRG tariffs for hospitals. Budgets covered the costs of adjusting wards, creating new (ICU) beds, and hiring staff. We conclude that public payers assumed most of the COVID-19-related financial risk. In view of future pandemics policymakers should work to increase resilience of payment systems by: (1) having systems in place to rapidly adjust payment systems; (2) being aware of the economic incentives created by these adjustments such as cost-containment or increasing the number of patients or services, that can result in unintended consequences such as risk selection or overprovision of care; and (3) periodically evaluating the effects of payment adjustments on access and quality of care.

SUBMITTER: Waitzberg R

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8492384 | biostudies-literature | 2022 May

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Balancing financial incentives during COVID-19: A comparison of provider payment adjustments across 20 countries.

Waitzberg Ruth R Gerkens Sophie S Dimova Antoniya A Bryndová Lucie L Vrangbæk Karsten K Jervelund Signe Smith SS Birk Hans Okkels HO Rajan Selina S Habicht Triin T Tynkkynen Liina-Kaisa LK Keskimäki Ilmo I Or Zeynep Z Gandré Coralie C Winkelmann Juliane J Ricciardi Walter W de Belvis Antonio Giulio AG Poscia Andrea A Morsella Alisha A Slapšinskaitė Agnė A Miščikienė Laura L Kroneman Madelon M de Jong Judith J Tambor Marzena M Sowada Christoph C Scintee Silvia Gabriela SG Vladescu Cristian C Albreht Tit T Bernal-Delgado Enrique E Angulo-Pueyo Ester E Estupiñán-Romero Francisco F Janlöv Nils N Mantwill Sarah S Van Ginneken Ewout E Quentin Wilm W

Health policy (Amsterdam, Netherlands) 20211006 5

Provider payment mechanisms were adjusted in many countries in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Our objective was to review adjustments for hospitals and healthcare professionals across 20 countries. We developed an analytical framework distinguishing between payment adjustments compensating income loss and those covering extra costs related to COVID-19. Information was extracted from the Covid-19 Health System Response Monitor (HSRM) and classified according to the framework. We found ...[more]

PMID: 34711443

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Project description:ObjectivesCommunity-based health insurance (CBI) is a common mechanism to generate financial resources for health care in developing countries. We review for the first time provider payment methods used in CBI in developing countries and their impact on CBI performance.MethodsWe conducted a systematic review of the literature on provider payment methods used by CBI in developing countries published up to January 2010.ResultsInformation on provider payment was available for a total of 32 CBI schemes in 34 reviewed publications: 17 schemes in South Asia, 10 in sub-Saharan Africa, 4 in East Asia and 1 in Latin America. Various types of provider payment were applied by the CBI schemes: 17 used fee-for-service, 12 used salaries, 9 applied a coverage ceiling, 7 used capitation and 6 applied a co-insurance. The evidence suggests that provider payment impacts CBI performance through provider participation and support for CBI, population enrolment and patient satisfaction with CBI, quantity and quality of services provided and provider and patient retention. Lack of provider participation in designing and choosing a CBI payment method can lead to reduced provider support for the scheme.ConclusionCBI schemes in developing countries have used a wide range of provider payment methods. The existing evidence suggests that payment methods are a key determinant of CBI performance and sustainability, but the strength of this evidence is limited since it is largely based on observational studies rather than on trials or on quasi-experimental research. According to the evidence, provider payment can affect provider participation, satisfaction and retention in CBI; the quantity and quality of services provided to CBI patients; patient demand of CBI services; and population enrollment, risk pooling and financial sustainability of CBI. CBI schemes should carefully consider how their current payment methods influence their performance, how changes in the methods could improve performance, and how such effects could be assessed with scientific rigour to increase the strength of evidence on this topic.

Project description:ImportancePrior studies found that financial incentives have small, positive direct effects in increasing COVID-19 vaccination rates, but unmeasured social spillovers (ie, changes in outcomes among untreated individuals who are socially exposed to policy beneficiaries) may diminish the overall effect of such policies.ObjectiveTo assess the spillover effects of a COVID-19 vaccination financial incentive and assess whether incorporating estimates of spillover meaningfully affects broader evaluations of policy effectiveness.Design, setting, and participantsThis population-level, address-cluster randomized clinical trial was conducted in November 2021. Participants were all adult (aged ≥18 years) residents of Ravensburg, Germany, who were randomly assigned to the treatment or control group. One resident in each address cluster was randomly selected to be an address-cluster representative. Address-cluster representatives in the treatment group received the treatment letter; all other cohabitants at that same address received the control letter. All individuals in addresses randomly assigned to the control group were mailed a control letter. Intention-to-treat data analysis was conducted from January 2022 to May 2024.InterventionControl letters informed recipients about 7 upcoming free COVID-19 vaccination events. Treatment letters were identical to control letters, except they also offered €40 (US $41.46) for getting vaccinated at one of the events.Main outcome and measurePrimary and booster COVID-19 vaccination uptake was observed and recorded on site during the public vaccination events. Primary vaccinations were defined as either the first dose of a 1-dose vaccine or the first or second dose of a 2-doses vaccine. Boosters were defined as any dose after primary vaccination. Three types of commonly used treatment effects were analyzed: direct, spillover, and overall.ResultsAmong 41 548 Ravensburg residents (mean [SD] age, 49.96 [19.04] years; 51.3% female), 796 (1.9%) were vaccinated at 1 of the 7 public vaccination events. The direct, spillover, and overall effects of receiving a financial incentive on primary vaccinations were all nonsignificant. For booster vaccinations, the direct effect was negative but not statistically significant (-0.32 percentage points [95% CI, -0.77 to 0.14 percentage points]; P = .17), whereas the overall effect (-0.30 percentage points [95% CI, -0.51 to -0.09 percentage points]; P = .006) was significantly negative. The spillover effect was significantly negative (-0.29 percentage points [95% CI, -0.53 to -0.06 percentage points]; P = .01), but only for the first vaccination events.Conclusions and relevanceThis trial found null direct effects on COVID-19 vaccination uptake and negative effects on booster uptake among individuals who did not receive but were indirectly exposed to the financial incentives. The timing of this spillover suggests that cohabitants of financial incentive recipients postponed booster vaccination, thereby undermining the potential effectiveness of this policy.Trial registrationISRCTN identifier: ISRCTN59503725.

Dataset Information

Balancing financial incentives during COVID-19: A comparison of provider payment adjustments across 20 countries.

Publications

Balancing financial incentives during COVID-19: A comparison of provider payment adjustments across 20 countries.

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