Analysis of long-term strategies of riparian countries in transboundary river basins.

ABSTRACT: Transboundary river basins give rise to complex water-sharing decision making that can be analyzed as a game in the sense of dynamic game theory, as done in this work. The sharing of transboundary water resources depends on the long-term shifting interactions between upstream and downstream countries, which has received limited research attention in the past. The water-sharing strategy of a riparian country depends on the strategies of other countries over time. This paper presents an evolutionary game method to analyze the long-term water-sharing strategies of countries encompassing transboundary river basins over time. The method analyzes the evolutionary strategies of riparian countries and investigates evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) considering the payoff matrix. The evolutionar

SUBMITTER: Mirzaei-Nodoushan F 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8511225 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Oct

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature