Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence.

ABSTRACT: Competition for social influence is a major force shaping societies, from baboons guiding their troop in different directions, to politicians competing for voters, to influencers competing for attention on social media. Social influence is invariably a competitive exercise with multiple influencers competing for it. We study which strategy maximizes social influence under competition. Applying game theory to a scenario where two advisers compete for the attention of a client, we find that the rational solution for advisers is to communicate truthfully when favored by the client, but to lie when ignored. Across seven pre-registered studies, testing 802 participants, such a strategic adviser consistently outcompeted an honest adviser. Strategic dishonesty outperformed truth-telling in swayin

SUBMITTER: Kurvers RHJM 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8661551 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature