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Ecology drives the evolution of diverse social strategies in Pseudomonas aeruginosa.


ABSTRACT: Bacteria often cooperate by secreting molecules that can be shared as public goods between cells. Because the production of public goods is subject to cheating by mutants that exploit the good without contributing to it, there has been great interest in elucidating the evolutionary forces that maintain cooperation. However, little is known about how bacterial cooperation evolves under conditions where cheating is unlikely to be of importance. Here we use experimental evolution to follow changes in the production of a model public good, the iron-scavenging siderophore pyoverdine, of the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. After 1200 generations of evolution in nine different environments, we observed that cheaters only reached high frequency in liquid medium with low iron availability. Conver

SUBMITTER: Figueiredo ART 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC9291133 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Oct

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature