Dataset Information

A game theoretic approach identifies conditions that foster vaccine-rich to vaccine-poor country donation of surplus vaccines.

ABSTRACT:

Background

Scarcity in supply of COVID-19 vaccines and severe international inequality in their allocation present formidable challenges. These circumstances stress the importance of identifying the conditions under which self-interested vaccine-rich countries will voluntarily donate their surplus vaccines to vaccine-poor countries.

Methods

We develop a game-theoretical approach to identify the vaccine donation strategy that is optimal for the vaccine-rich countries as a whole; and to determine whether the optimal strategy is stable (Nash equilibrium or self-enforcing agreement). We examine how the results depend on the following parameters: the fraction of the global unvaccinated population potentially covered if all vaccine-rich countries donate their entire surpluses; the expected emergence rate of variants of concern (VOC); and the relative cost of a new VOC outbreak that is unavoidable despite having surplus doses.

Results

We show that full or partial donations of the surplus stock are optimal in certain parameter ranges. Notably, full surplus donation is optimal if the global amount of surplus vaccines is sufficiently large. Within a more restrictive parameter region, these optimal strategies are also stable.

Conclusions

Our results imply that, under certain conditions, coordination between vaccine-rich countries can lead to significant surplus donations even by strictly self-interested countries. However, if the global amount that countries can donate is small, we expect no contribution from self-interested countries. The results provide guidance to policy makers in identifying the circumstances in which coordination efforts for vaccine donation are likely to be most effective.

SUBMITTER: Lampert A

PROVIDER: S-EPMC9395896 | biostudies-literature | 2022

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Publications

A game theoretic approach identifies conditions that foster vaccine-rich to vaccine-poor country donation of surplus vaccines.

Lampert Adam A Sulitzeanu-Kenan Raanan R Vanhuysse Pieter P Tepe Markus M

Communications medicine 20220823

<h4>Background</h4>Scarcity in supply of COVID-19 vaccines and severe international inequality in their allocation present formidable challenges. These circumstances stress the importance of identifying the conditions under which self-interested vaccine-rich countries will voluntarily donate their surplus vaccines to vaccine-poor countries.<h4>Methods</h4>We develop a game-theoretical approach to identify the vaccine donation strategy that is optimal for the vaccine-rich countries as a whole; an ...[more]

PMID: 36004278

Similar Datasets

Project description:BackgroundInfectious diseases such as COVID-19 and HIV/AIDS are behaviorally challenging for persons, vaccine and drug companies, and donors.MethodsIn 3 linked games in which a disease may or may not be contracted, N persons choose risky or safe behavior (game 1). Two vaccine companies (game 2) and 2 drug companies (game 3) choose whether to develop vaccines and drugs. Each person chooses whether to buy 1 vaccine (if no disease contraction) or 1 drug (if disease contraction). A donor subsidizes vaccine and drug developments and purchases. Nature probabilistically chooses disease contraction, recovery versus death with and without each drug, and whether vaccines and drugs are developed successfully. COVID-19 data are used for parameter estimation.ResultsEach person chooses risky behavior if its utility outweighs safe behavior, accounting for nature's probability of disease contraction which depends on how many are vaccinated. Each person buys a vaccine or drug if the companies produce them and if their utilities (accounting for side effects and virus mutation) outweigh the costs, which may be subsidized by a sponsor.DiscussionDrug purchases depend on nature's recovery probability exceeding the probability in the absence of a drug. Each company develops and produces a vaccine or drug if nature's probability of successful development is high, if sufficiently many persons buy the vaccine or drug at a sales price that sufficiently exceeds the production price, and if the donor sponsors.ConclusionAccounting for all players' interlinked decisions allowing 14 outcomes, which is challenging without a game theoretic analysis, the donor maximizes all persons' expected utilities at the societal level to adjust how persons' purchases and the companies' development and production are subsidized.HighlightsA game theoretic approach can help explain the production decisions of vaccine and drug companies, and the decisions of persons and a donor, impacted by Nature.In 3 linked games, N persons choose risky behavior if its utility outweighs safe behavior.Vaccine and drug companies develop vaccines and drugs sponsored by a donor if profitable, allowing 14 outcomes.

Dataset Information

A game theoretic approach identifies conditions that foster vaccine-rich to vaccine-poor country donation of surplus vaccines.

Background

Methods

Results

Conclusions

Publications

A game theoretic approach identifies conditions that foster vaccine-rich to vaccine-poor country donation of surplus vaccines.

Similar Datasets

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