Competition among public good providers for donor rewards.
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ABSTRACT: We present experimental evidence for decision settings where public good providers compete for endogenous rewards which are donations (transfers) offered by outside donors. Donors receive benefits from public good provision but cannot provide the good themselves. The performance of three competition mechanisms is examined in relation to the level of public good provision and transfers offered by donors. In addition to a contest where transfers received by public good providers are proportional to effort, we study two contests with exclusion from transfers, namely a winner-takes-all and a loser-gets-nothing. We compare behavior in these three decision settings to the default setting of no-contest (no-transfers). Results for this novel decision environment with endogenous transfers sh
SUBMITTER: Struwe N
PROVIDER: S-EPMC9458484 | biostudies-literature | 2022 Sep
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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