Expression of Concern: Liberals lecture, conservatives communicate: Analyzing complexity and ideology in 381,609 political speeches.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: PLOS ONE Editors
PROVIDER: S-EPMC9662719 | biostudies-literature | 2022
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Expression of Concern: Liberals lecture, conservatives communicate: Analyzing complexity and ideology in 381,609 political speeches.
PloS one 20221114 11
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