Honesty in signalling games is maintained by trade-offs rather than costs.

ABSTRACT:

Background

Signal reliability poses a central problem for explaining the evolution of communication. According to Zahavi's Handicap Principle, signals are honest only if they are costly at the evolutionary equilibrium; otherwise, deception becomes common and communication breaks down. Theoretical signalling games have proved to be useful for understanding the logic of signalling interactions. Theoretical evaluations of the Handicap Principle are difficult, however, because finding the equilibrium cost function in such signalling games is notoriously complicated. Here, we provide a general solution to this problem and show how cost functions can be calculated for any arbitrary, pairwise asymmetric signalling game at the evolutionary equilibrium.

Results

Our model clarifies th

SUBMITTER: Szamado S 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC9827650 | biostudies-literature | 2023 Jan

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature